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# basic education

Department:  
Basic Education  
**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA**

## **SENIOR CERTIFICATE EXAMINATIONS/ NATIONAL SENIOR CERTIFICATE EXAMINATIONS**

**HISTORY P2**

**MAY/JUNE 2025**

**ADDENDUM**

**This addendum consists of 14 pages.**



**QUESTION 1: HOW EFFECTIVE WERE THE STRATEGIES OF THE BLACK SASH IN MOBILISING AGAINST THE APARTHEID REGIME IN THE 1980s?**

**SOURCE 1A**

The extract below, taken from an article titled 'The Conscience of White South Africa: Celebrating the Black Sash, 60 Years Later', written by M Thamm, a journalist, appeared in the *Daily Maverick* Newspaper on 14 May 2015. It focuses on the formation and strategies of the Black Sash.

The Black Sash started on 19 May 1955, over a cup of tea by six middle-class white women outraged (angered) by the then government attempts at removing 'coloured' citizens from the voter's roll. The Black Sash developed into a powerful force for protest and change that served as a visible prod (push) to the conscience of those who implemented and benefitted from an unjust system. Jean Sinclair, Ruth Folley, Elizabeth McLaren, Tertia Pybus, Jean Bosazza and Helen Newton-Thompson launched the Women's Defence of the Constitution League\*. The organisation held a conference in Port Elizabeth.

Strategies employed by this 'silent sisterhood' included 'black-sashing' – or the wearing of a black sash – during silent protest from the public gallery in Parliament. The withering stares (side eye) of the women no doubt served to unsettle ministers in the ruling National Party regime, who detested (disliked) this group of apparently well dressed, genteel (well-mannered) and mostly English-speaking white women who used their position to challenge them.

In the 1980s the various advice offices of the Black Sash ran across the country and staffed by volunteers, became crucial points of resistance for the black majority in terms of challenging apartheid legislation, mass arrests, access to information and sometimes simply to enable the provision of food and other emergencies. The advice offices offered free services also with regard to issues of employment, housing, pensions and access to health. The Black Sash were also an invaluable (a helpful) source of information for newspapers operating in difficult circumstances with constant harassment by the state, bringing vital (important) news to the attention of journalists.

[From *Daily Maverick* newspaper, 14 May 2015]

**\*Women's Defence of the Constitution League:** The official title of the Black Sash ...



**SOURCE 1B**

The photograph below appeared in *The Observation Post – South African Military History* publication, on 3 October 2015. It depicts members of the Black Sash in support of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) defiance campaign with anti-apartheid placards, in Cape Town, in August 1989.



[From *The Observation Post – South African Military History*, 3 October 2015]

ONE PERSON ONE VOTE

UNBAN RESTRICTED ORGANIZATIONS

DEFIANCE IS THE RIGHT TO PEACEFUL PROTEST

BLACK SASH



**SOURCE 1C**

The extract below is from a letter, titled 'Persecution of children' by Marie Dyer, a representative of the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) and constant writer for the Natal Midlands Black Sash (NMBS). It was written to the local press (*The Natal Witness*) in support of the Free the Children Campaign that was launched by the Black Sash on 10 December 1986.

White South Africans often feel aggrieved (upset) that in this brutal and violent world our own regime is singled out among all other tyrannies (oppressors) for general condemnation ...

But lately that has been an aspect of South African oppression that in itself seems not to be exceeded or matched in other regimes that white South Africans loudly condemn. I refer to the deliberate campaign against children, which was intensified during the state of emergency and is still continuing.

The state of emergency is officially over; but children in many places continue to be the specific targets of official persecution (torture) and harassment. Furthermore, the damage inflicted by their experiences will remain with them – and us – for the rest of their lives.

The Black Sash proposes to observe 1 June, this year (1987), as a national children's day when South Africans will be asked to consider the nature and implications of these events. In tolerating them our 'Western Christian' society has surely lost its claim to being ordinarily civilised.

[From *STANDING ON STREET CORNERS – A History of the Natal Midlands Region of the Black Sash*  
by M Kleinenberg and C Merrett]



**SOURCE 1D**

The extract below is from a book published in 1991. The book, titled *Black Sash, The Beginning of a Bridge in South Africa*, by K Spink, chronicled (reported) women's human rights abuses for the Black Sash. It outlines how PW Botha's government reacted to the leaders of the Black Sash.

The policy of the Black Sash as an organisation was to uphold (maintain) the rule of law with its absolute commitment to lawful and peaceful protest, rather than being a burden to the government. One Black Sash member went to prison for refusing to make a statement about a visit to Winnie Mandela, another was jailed rather than dismiss a domestic worker who could not be registered. Others had deliberately taken part in illegal gatherings and marches.

On 12 June 1986 Annica van Gylswyk, chairperson of the Black Sash Pretoria branch, was arrested in her own home in the early hours of the morning. She was kept in solitary confinement in the Pretoria prison for several weeks and then taken to police cells, where she was interrogated. The arrival of security police in Janet Small's office took her completely by surprise. She was told to pack a bag and taken to prison almost immediately. Because there were no other white women in detention, and because the prison authorities were very strict about racial segregation, she found herself in solitary confinement for three months.

On her release she was given a restriction order, which was not unusual, but which she found particularly difficult because it restricted her, not to the house where she had been living in Grahamstown but to Cape Town and her parents' home, where she should be in the house, each night, between the hours 6 p.m. and 5 a.m. She was not allowed to work for the Black Sash anymore. She was not supposed to speak to journalists or write for publication.

[From *Black Sash, The Beginning of a Bridge in South Africa* by K Spink]



**QUESTION 2: WHY WAS THE MOHAPI FAMILY DISSATISFIED WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC) DEALT WITH THE DEATH OF MAPETLA MOHAPI IN 1976?**

**SOURCE 2A**

The source below is from a book titled *COMING TO TERMS – SOUTH AFRICA'S SEARCH FOR TRUTH* by M Meredith. It highlights Mapetla Mohapi's political life until his death in 1976.

Mapetla Frank Mohapi was born in the rural village of Jozanashoek, Sterkspruit, in the former Transkei (now the Eastern Cape) on 2 September 1947. He studied at the University of the North (Turfloop) – today the University of Limpopo, where he graduated with a degree in social work in the early 1970s.

While studying at Turfloop, he was drawn to the philosophy of Black Consciousness and became active in the South African Students Organisation (SASO) as a regional secretary in the Eastern Cape. After students at several black universities held pro-FRELIMO\* rallies in October 1974 to celebrate the independence of Mozambique, Mohapi, together with several other leaders of SASO and the Black People's Convention, were detained in November 1974. He was released in ... 1975 without charge.

In 1973 he married Nonhle. Then in 1974, whilst Nonhle was expecting their daughter, Mohapi was detained for eight months. In September 1975, Mohapi was banned under the Internal Security Act and restricted to King William's Town, where he was later employed as an administrator of the Zimele Trust Fund, established to assist released political prisoners.

A month after the start of the 1976 Soweto Uprising, in a swoop (rounding up) of Black Consciousness activists, Mapetla was again detained without charge on 16 July. Twenty days later, on 5 August 1976, Mohapi died in police custody.

[From *COMING TO TERMS – SOUTH AFRICA'S SEARCH FOR TRUTH* by M Meredith]

\***FRELIMO**: Mozambique Liberation Front



**SOURCE 2B**

The extract below is from the TRC hearing on human rights violations of Mapetla Mohapi, held on 15 April 1996. The TRC's Human Rights Violations Committee was represented by Tiny Miya – who posed questions and the Mohapi family was represented by his wife – Nonhle Mohapi. It highlights the reasons why Nonhle Mohapi requested the TRC to investigate how Mapetla Mohapi died after having previously opened a civil case that went up to the Supreme Court in 1979, but was unsuccessful.

**MS MAYA:** We see you before the Truth Commission this morning Mrs Nonhle (Mohapi). Can you please tell us why you are here, just before we start with our proceedings.

**MRS MOHAPI:** As I've already mentioned I was never happy in the 20 years about the matter of Mapetla, but now, even now, I'm sure that he was never killed in any other way. After hearing about the TRC I told myself, I want to come and give evidence about the hurt that I felt. I want to tell the Commission so that they can assist me in finding out what happened to him because he never killed himself.

**MS MAYA:** What did they say was the reason for his suicide?

**MRS MOHAPI:** The letters which were available during the inquest, there was one amongst them of which it was said to be the suicide letter. The writing was very exclusive (different) and it did not belong to Mapetla. But this one was also written on toilet paper as my husband previously did write, and the experts who looked at the writing confirmed that the writing in the suicide note is very exclusive. They tried their best and tried to make a good scrutiny (investigation). We waited for the response.

**MS MAYA:** What was the inquest?

**MRS MOHAPI:** We were surprised about the inquest, that still nobody was accused about this. There was a civil court at Grahamstown, these also went on in Grahamstown and there was a policeman who took out some letters to give testimony about the crime and he confirmed that this man (Mohapi) would never take his life.

**MS MAYA:** What was the result?

**MRS MOHAPI:** In the Supreme Court it was also said that nobody could be blamed about what happened. ... we were told that we have lost the case and we have to pay the costs. We went home where I received a letter from the court stating that the account which I'm owing was about R250 000. They also wrote to find out how they can liquidate\* me and I would have to write a list of everything, my house included.

[From *The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report*, Vol. 3, 1998]

\***Liquidate:** when property and household items are sold to raise money to pay for debts owed



**SOURCE 2C**

The photograph below was taken by Zolani Mabusela, a spokesperson for the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) in 2017. It appeared in an article titled 'Honouring the Legacy of Mapetla Mohapi: A Martyr in the Struggle Against Oppression!', published by the *Amandla* newspaper, 41 years after Mapetla Mohapi's death. It depicts the Mohapi family members, from the left, Motheba Mohapi, Mizuki Gugushe (8 years), Nohle Mohapi (wife), Konehali Mohapi-Gugushe and Naledi Gugushe (10 years), outside the Kei Road Police Station. They had travelled 400 kilometres from Port Elizabeth, but the station commander denied access to the cell where the former activist Mapetla Mohapi had died in 1976.



[From *Amandla* newspaper, 5 August 2024]

**KEI ROAD  
POLICE STATION**



**SOURCE 2D**

The extract below is from a review by Gcina Ntsaluba, an investigative journalist, of the book titled *Now You Know How Mapetla Died: The Story of a Black Consciousness Martyr*, a historian, by Z Valela. It criticised the TRC for not doing justice to Mohapi's case and the government for not doing anything to pursue the case further.

Twenty years elapsed between Mohapi's murder and the deliberations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Valela has some harsh words for its *modus operandi* (the TRC's method of operation) that echoes the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO's) standpoint and some may find it unreasonable. Where she (Valela) is on firm ground, however, is to question exactly how the TRC has served justice in Mohapi's case. No one came forward to seek amnesty and the government did nothing to pursue the known suspects. Not only is accountability unfulfilled, but the original inquest verdict is still part of the judicial record, and historical truth remains incomplete.

As Valela points out, where inquests have been successfully re-opened this has been due to private initiative and resources. Ironically, Mohapi was awarded a post-apartheid honour, but so far has been denied the dignity of re-examination of the circumstances of his death. This can be ascribed (explained by) to the general state of corrupt inertia (inaction) in government.

Perhaps this book will alter a shameful state of affairs. But even if it has no effect on this particular case, it serves as a telling warning of the extreme dangers of a police state operating outside the bounds of the rule of law. Given the contempt (disrespect) displayed by major sections of the present-day ANC for the latter, a return to such circumstances is not impossible.

[From *Mail & Guardian*, 29 May 2022]



**QUESTION 3: HOW DID TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND AFRICA EVOLVE BETWEEN THE 1970s AND 2023?****SOURCE 3A**

The extract below is taken from a paper titled 'Globalisation and sustainable Africa-China trade: what role play the African regional organisations' by D Cissé and was published by a Swedish-based research institute. It highlights how trade relations between China and Africa have developed since the 1970s.

China's trade liberalisation and openness to the world since the 1970s have boosted its foreign trade. Economic shifts, particularly based on trade, industrial reforms and later the manufacture of products to sell abroad, have increased China's trade relationships with developed and developing countries. China's push to liberalise goes hand in hand with long-term strategies to establish ties with developing countries, including those in Africa.

Through its growing position in the world economic arena, China aims to shape the world political economy. Africa has had long-term engagement with China. While in the past, this engagement was aid-driven, today it is more economic-driven and underpinned by trade and investment. The diversification of trade partners among African countries by looking East meets China's long-term strategy for resources and markets.

Alongside globalisation, China has developed strategic ties with African countries for strong economic cooperation based on non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual benefit or win-win cooperation. China's 'go out' policy of the late 1990s, the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, and the release of the White Paper on China's Africa policy in 2006 demonstrate China's interest in Africa.

[From 'Globalisation and sustainable Africa-China trade: what role play the African regional organisations' by D Cissé]



**SOURCE 3B**

The extract below is taken from a keynote speech delivered by China's President Xi Jinping at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, on 3 September 2018. It highlights China's commitment to contributing to the development of Africa.

First, China will launch an industrial promotion initiative. We have decided to open a China-Africa economic and trade expo in China; we encourage Chinese companies to increase investment in Africa, and will build and upgrade a number of economic and trade cooperation zones in Africa. We will support Africa in achieving general food security by 2030, work with Africa to formulate and implement a programme of action to promote China-Africa cooperation on agricultural modernisation.

We will implement 50 agricultural assistance programmes, provide RMB\* 1 billion (approximately R2,47 billion) of emergency humanitarian food assistance to African countries affected by natural disasters, send 500 senior agriculture experts to Africa, and train young researchers in agriscience and entrepreneurs in agribusiness. We will support Chinese companies in Africa to forge (build) alliance of corporate social responsibilities. We will continue to strengthen cooperation with African countries in local currency settlement and make good use of the China-Africa Development Fund, the China-Africa Fund for Industrial Cooperation and the Special Loan for the Development of African Small-Medium Enterprises (SMEs).

We will work with Africa to undertake a number of key connectivity projects. We will support Africa in developing the Single African Air Transport Market and open more direct flights between China and Africa. On the basis of following multilateral rules and procedures, we will support African countries in making better use of financing resources of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, and the Silk Road Fund.


[From *China Daily*, 4 September 2018]

**\*RMB = RENMINBI (The official Chinese currency)**



**SOURCE 3C**

The cartoon below was published in the *Hustle East Africa* magazine on 6 August 2018. It highlights a view on the China-Africa economic relationship.



[From *Hustle East Africa* magazine, 6 August 2018]

USA



**SOURCE 3D**

The extract below, taken from *A Roadmap for Strategically Countering China's Development Influence in Africa*, written by J Malobisky, was published by the New Lines Institute of the George Washington University on 18 January 2024. It highlights the challenges created by China's expansion into Africa.

While the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure investments appear to offer attractive development opportunities, the initiative has created challenges for African countries that have been unable to pay back the programme's high-interest loans and are now caught in a debt trap. Continued exploitation under neo-colonialism in Africa has contributed to a wealth gap that contributes to some countries' inability to make payments on Chinese infrastructure loans, forcing these states to borrow additional money. China, which rarely cancels these debts, has used debt traps to expand its influence over African countries by forcing states to restructure their debt with long-term repayment plans that cede (give up) mining and natural resource rights to China under the guise of collecting collateral (security) for debt owed.

Nevertheless, African countries have continued to seek Chinese infrastructural investment money. In October, Beijing hosted its annual Belt and Road Initiative Forum, where President Xi Jinping announced \$100 billion of new funding for physical infrastructure and green energy projects. The attendance of leaders from Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and the Republic of the Congo signals that many African states continue to prefer working with China to Western countries. Across the continent, there continues to be a positive perception of China because of its willingness to sponsor infrastructure projects in any African country. However, there is also concern among Africans that their governments are too deeply indebted (financially dependent) to China. This widespread concern can provide an opportunity for the United States to engage with the continent and provide an alternative form of development that does not create a debt burden.

[From the New Lines Institute: *A Roadmap for Strategically Countering China's Development Influence in Africa* by J Malobisky, 18 January 2024]



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:

*Amandla* newspaper, 5 August 2024

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